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In an interesting recent article, Froman 
and Hubert (1980) considered the application 
of prediction analysis techniques developed 
by Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal (1977) 
to issues involving the developmental priority 
of concepts. These statistical techniques and 
their application by Froman and Hubert are 
particularly noteworthy in that they are not 
limited simply to deciding between sequence 
(one concept develops before another) and syn-
chrony (two concepts emerge simultaneously) 
but rather can deal with more complex pat-
terns of interrelationship of the sort discussed 
by Flavell (1971), Moshman (1977), Wohlwill 
(1973), and others. The purpose of this article 
is to suggest a serious problem that should be 
taken into account in the further development 
of prediction analysis and its applications to 
issues of developmental priority. 
Consider a very simple case in which we 
simply assess the presence or absence of each 
of two concepts in a sample of subjects. Ta-
ble 1 presents some hypothetical data dis-
cussed by Froman and Hubert (1980, p.138). 
The data in Table 1 indicate that the majority 
of those (34) subjects who showed exactly one 
of the two concepts showed B only (32) rather 
than A only (2). As Froman and Hubert noted, 
various simple statistical techniques for test-
ing developmental priority confirm this obser-
vation, thus supporting the conclusion that B 
generally develops before A. (One might even 
suggest an invariant sequence here if one is 
willing to attribute the two discrepant cases 
to measurement error.) 
Froman and Hubert argued, however, that 
any such conclusion would be an obvious mis-
take, since the data were specifically setup to 
reflect total independence of the two concepts 
(i.e., each cell frequency equals the expected 
frequency derivable from the marginal totals, 
given an assumption of independence). They 
then go on to present a prediction procedure 
that essentially overcomes this problem by 
comparing the various cell frequencies not di-
rectly with each other but with expected fre-
quencies based on the marginals and an as-
sumption of independence. 
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Froman and Hubert (1980) have attempted to show how recently developed prediction analysis tech-
niques may be applied to issues of developmental priority, that is, to clarifying the interrelationship 
between two developing concepts. Although this work is in some respects an important advance over 
earlier statistical techniques, it seems to raise new problems: (a) It goes too far in identifying issues 
of developmental priority (sequence vs. synchrony) with issues of statistical relationship (dependence 
vs. independence) and thus (b) unjustifiably fails to consider certain information inherent in the data 
which, although irrelevant to issues of statistical relationship, is highly relevant to issues of devel-
opmental priority. The present application of prediction analysis techniques to questions of develop-
mental priority thus raises new difficulties at least as serious as those it resolves.
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Though this new procedure initially sounds 
reasonable, it suffers from a serious confusion 
of developmental priority (sequence vs. syn-
chrony) with statistical relationship (indepen-
dence vs. dependence). Paradoxical as it may 
seem, statistical independence does not rule 
out developmental priority, and the present 
hypothetical data are a clear example of this. 
With respect to independence, the relatively 
large number of subjects in the B-only cell (32) 
can be dismissed as an artifact of the unequal 
marginals and thus does not count as con-
trary evidence. With respect to developmental 
priority, however, an appeal to the marginals 
will not do, since the marginals themselves 
reflect developmental priority: The majority of 
subjects show B (see row totals) but only a mi-
nority show A (see column totals), suggesting 
a tendency for B to develop first in the popula-
tion of which the present subjects constitute a 
sample. Any analysis of cell frequencies which 
“corrects” for these marginals is correcting for 
actual evidence of developmental priority and 
thus reduces the probability of reaching the 
appropriate conclusion. 
The importance of this problem is illus-
trated in Froman and Hubert’s discussion of 
my (1977) data. Froman and Hubert main-
tained on the basis of a detailed prediction 
analysis that the Common Sense I (CSI) 
model provides at least as good a fit for the 
data as the consolidation (C) model that I find 
more convincing. Intuitively, their conclusion 
is surprising, since the two models differ only 
with respect to a single cell (see their Figure 
5, p. 144); the actual number of subjects fall-
ing in that cell is quite small, conforming to 
the prediction of the C model. Froman and 
Hubert (1980) argued, however, that their 
analysis avoids the statistical traps that have 
ensnared others: 
In particular, significant differences be-
tween off-diagonal cells is insufficient for 
the establishment of developmental prior-
ity, since any statement on a temporal order 
of acquisition must account for the cell fre-
quencies that are expected under statistical 
independence,(p. 145) 
Thus the apparent support for the C model is 
seen as an artifact of the unequal marginal 
totals. The problem with their conclusion is 
that the C and CSI models actually make dif-
ferent predictions about the marginal totals 
themselves. For example, it is clear from Fro-
man and Hubert’s Figure 5 (p. 144) that the 
C model (but not the CSI model) predicts that 
for each of the two sections in their Table 3 
(p. 144), the marginal total for the second row 
exceeds the marginal total for the second col-
umn (reflecting the underlying prediction of C 
theory that subjects remain transitional lon-
ger on the negated version of each task). It is 
thus not surprising that after “correcting” for 
marginal totals that support the C model, the 
support of the data for that model is consider-
ably attenuated.
Though there seems to be a serious prob-
lem with the prediction analysis approach, 
the present critique should not be construed 
as suggesting that the earlier approaches Fro-
man and Hubert criticized were unproblem-
atical. In fact, at a deeper theoretical level, 
Froman and Hubert may well be on the right 
track. Clearly, our ultimate goal in research 
on developmental priority is not to establish a 
static cross-classificational picture but rather 
to better understand the intricate causal dy-
namics linking the development of various 
concepts. Thus we need to consider the di-
rectional or reciprocal dependence of the con-
cepts under consideration. However, the pre-
diction analysis approach seems to get at 
issues of dependence only at the expense of ig-
noring orthogonal issues of developmental pri-
ority. Moreover, statistical dependence is rel-
evant here only to the extent that it reflects 
an underlying causal-developmental depen-
dence, and in the absence of longitudinal and 
Table 1
Hypothetical Frequency Distribution for Two 
Concepts
                                          Concept A
Concept B          Absent       Present            Total
 Absent 8 2 10
 Present 32 8 40
 Total 40 10 50
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experimental data, this is a difficult thing to 
judge. Unless prediction analysis can be fur-
ther developed to deal with these issues, its 
application to questions of developmental pri-
ority raises new difficulties at least as serious 
as those it resolves.
References
Flavell, J. H. Stage-related properties of cognitive 
development. Cognitive Psychology, 1971, 2, 
421–453.
Froman, T., & Hubert, L. J. Application of predic-
tion analysis to developmental priority. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 1980, 87, 136–146.
Hildebrand, D., Laing, M., & Rosenthal, A. Pre-
diction analysis of cross classifications. New 
York: Wiley, 1977.
Moshman, D. Consolidation and stage formation in 
the emergence of formal operations. Develop-
mental Psychology, 1977, 13, 95–100.
Wohlwill, J. F. The study of behavioral develop-
ment. New York: Academic Press, 1973.
